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IN MY VIEW
PRESTIGE AND PARTICIPATION
Sir:
To the section “The Pacific War,” pages 24–25, in Peter J. Dean’s Autumn 2014 ar-
ticle in this journal, “Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian De-
fense Policy,” could be added discussion of the 1945 Australian operation against 
previously bypassed Japanese-held areas and Australian operations against Dutch 
Borneo. These operations were conceived, developed, and implemented because 
of Australian domestic political and economic factors, the ambition of Australian 
general Thomas Blamey and others who would execute these operations, and 
long-range postwar political and diplomatic objectives. These operations were 
opposed by General Douglas MacArthur.
The Australian people wanted their troops used in combat in 1945 or demobi-
lized for civilian work. Anticipating these operations, Australian prime minister 
John Curtin informed British prime minister Winston Churchill on 8 October 
1943 (quoting hereafter from my article in the January 1985 Military Affairs), 
“‘The Government [of Australia] considers it to be a matter of vital importance . . . 
that her military effort should be concentrated as much as possible in the Pacific 
and that it should be on a scale to guarantee her an effective voice in the peace 
settlement.’ In June 1945, answering criticism of the use of Australian forces to 
liquidate previously bypassed Japanese-held areas, Prime Minister [Ben] Chifley 
explained, ‘From the aspect of prestige and participation in the Pacific peace set-
tlement, it is of great imperative [sic] to Australia to be associated with the drive 
to defeat Japan.’ At the San Francisco Conference a few weeks later, the Australian 
representatives ‘stressed that the war effort that Australia has made and intends to 
continue until Japan is defeated entitles us to a special consideration of our views 
on and our part in the final Pacific settlement.’ 
[paragraph omitted]
“Prime Minister Curtin told his House of Representatives [on 24 April 1945] 
the Australian government ‘considered it was both logical and appropriate that 
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Australian forces should take over the islands which formed our outer screen of 
defence and which were mostly our own territory�’ And he went on: ‘The Govern-
ment accepts full responsibility for the operations that are being carried out�’ The 
Australian general in charge, Blamey, kept MacArthur informed of those opera-
tions, but MacArthur, of course, gave ‘no specific instructions’ regarding them� 
The local commander in these operations had ‘considerable freedom of action as 
to methods to be employed�’ The Australian commanders involved chose ‘to carry 
out active operations in effecting neutralization where other commanders might 
decide on more passive measures�’
“When Curtin asked MacArthur his opinion of Blamey’s proposal ‘to attack the 
Japanese instead of using passive defense measures,’ MacArthur told Curtin that 
‘the tactics of the problem naturally were a responsibility of the local commander,’ 
but that he ‘was in disapproval of the method suggested as being unnecessary and 
wasteful of lives and resources�’ MacArthur ‘advised him [Curtin] strongly not to 
permit the tactical program suggested by General Blamey�’ Charges were raised 
in the Australian press that these Australian operations were not adequately 
equipped, supplied, and supported� These criticisms were not attacks upon 
MacArthur, since they concerned ‘the adequacy of Australian equipment and 
procedures,’ which were matters beyond the scope of MacArthur’s authority� And 
upon investigation, the charges were revealed to have been unfounded�”
JOSEPH FORBES
Pittsburgh, Pa.
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